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Abstract
The concept of Ambiguity designates those situations where the information available to the
decision maker is insu¢ cient to form a probabilistic view of the world. Thus, it has provided
the motivation for departing from the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) paradigm. Yet, the
formalization of the concept is missing. This is a grave omission as it leaves non-expected utility
models hanging on a shaky ground. In particular, it leaves unanswered basic questions such as:
(1) Does Ambiguity exist?; (2) If so, which situations should be labeled as "ambiguous"?; (3)
Why should one depart from Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) in the presence of Ambiguity?;
and (4) If so, what kind of behavior should emerge in the presence of Ambiguity? The present
paper lls these gaps. Specically, it identies those information structures that are incompatible
with SEU theory, and shows that their mathematical properties are the formal counterpart of the
intuitive idea of insu¢ cient information. These are used to give a formal denition of Ambiguity
and, consequently, to distinguish between ambiguous and unambiguous situations. Finally, the
paper shows that behavior not conforming to SEU theory must emerge in correspondence of
insu¢ cient information and identies the class of non-EU models that emerge in the face of
Ambiguity. The paper also proposes a new comparative denition of Ambiguity, and discusses
its relation with some of the existing literature.
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1 Introduction
The past few years have witnessed an ever increasing number of applications of non-Expected
Utility (non-EU) theories. This has been favored both by the recent theoretical developments
and by the general motivation underlying most non-EU theories. On the one hand, the structure
of many non-EU theories has been greatly claried (see [12] for a recent, comprehensive survey),
appropriate statistical tools have become available (see, for instance, [16], [18], [28]) and extensions
to dynamic settings have been successfully pursued ([8], [14], [26]). On the other hand, non-EU
theories seem to provide the right framework for dealing with problems that lie at the core of
Economics and Finance such as Macroeconomics Policy, Investment choice, Entrepreneurship and
Innovation, Portfolio choice etc. The common thread linking all these problems is the high level of
uncertainty surrounding them and, consequently, they all reduce to choice problems in the presence
of very limited information.
The idea that behavior in situations of limited information should be qualitatively di¤erent
from behavior in situations where information abounds is certainly not a new one (dating back
at least to F. Knight), and has been the main inspirational motive behind the theoretical work in
decision making under uncertainty. For instance, Marinacci [19, p. 1] motivates his work on the
multiple-prior model by saying "The basic idea ... is simple and appealing: since the decision maker
has not enough information to form a meaningful simple prior, he uses a set of priors, consisting of
all priors compatible with his limited information".
Intuitive arguments of this sort have not found, however, a formal counterpart. This is a
grave omission because it leaves non-EU models hanging on shaky ground. In particular, it leaves
unanswered basic questions such as: (1) Does Ambiguity exist?; (2) If so, which situations should
be labeled as "ambiguous"?; (3) Why should one depart from Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
in the presence of Ambiguity?; and (4) If so, what kind of behavior should emerge in the presence
of Ambiguity? The present paper lls these gaps. We will begin by studying the set of all possible
information structures that might be available to a decision maker. We will show that this consists
of two types: those that are compatible with SEU theory and those that are incompatible with it.
As we shall see, the mathematical properties of the latter provide the formal counterpart of the
intuitive idea of insu¢ cient information. We will use these properties to give a formal denition
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of Ambiguity and, consequently, to distinguish between ambiguous situations and unambiguous
ones. We will, then, show that behavior not conforming to SEU theory emerges in correspondence
of insu¢ cient information, thus e¤ectively providing the sought after informational foundation for
non-EU theories. Finally, we will identify the class of non-EU models that emerge in the face of
Ambiguity.
1.1 Paper outline
Our rst step consists of characterizing the environment within which our inquiry will take place.
We do so in Section 2 by determining, guratively speaking, the point where non-EU theories
depart from SEU theory. Starting with Section 3, we begin to explore the idea that this departure
might be due to the poor quality of the information available to the decision maker. The study of
Information is the subject matter of Sections 3 to 5. The main result is Theorem 8, which states that
in correspondence of certain information structures the decision makers behavior cannot conform
to SEU theory. In Section 6, we give a few examples of such information structures. In Section
7, we discuss the intuition behind their mathematical properties, thus showing that they are the
formal counterpart of the intuitive idea of insu¢ cient information. This section completes the
rst part of our program, that of showing that Ambiguity exists and that one must depart from
SEU theory in the presence of Ambiguity. These ndings are summarized in Section 8 by giving
a formal denition of Ambiguity. With the subsequent section, we move to the second part of our
program, that of identifying the types of non-EU behavior that emerge as a response to Ambiguity.
In Section 9, we isolate the set of all acts that the decision maker can evaluate on the basis of his
information. We call this set the set of subjectively measurable acts. The problem of identifying
the types of non-EU behavior that emerge in the face of Ambiguity takes the form of extending
the decision makers preference functional from the set subjectively measurable acts to the set of
all acts in a way that respects the decision makers information. The main result is Theorem 27
of Section 10 which identies the class of these non-EU behaviors. In Section 11, we study the set
of "predictives" in non-EU theories and its relation with the indicators of the Ambiguity perceived
by the decision maker. In the process, we propose a new comparative denition of Ambiguity, and
study its relation with that proposed by Ghirardato et al. in [10].
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2 Background and notation
The intuitive idea behind the study of non-EU models is that the decision maker would conform to
SEU theory if the information is, in some sense, good and would depart from it if the information
is not good. Our strategy to pursue this idea is as follows. If this intuition is correct, we should be
able to nd, imaginatively speaking, a point in the theory where the determination of whether or
not to conform to SEU theory has not been made yet. At that point, we would then plug in the
information available to the decision maker, and obtain SEU when we plug in good information
and non-EU when we plug in information that is not good. In this section, we begin our inquiry
by looking for this point.
Recall that, following Savage [24], the alternatives available to the decision maker are modeled
as mappings (S;)  ! X, where (S;) is a measurable space of states of the world and X is a
space of consequences. Let A denote the set of all alternatives, and let Ac be that of constant
alternatives, that is of constant mappings (S;)  ! X. Assume that X is a mixture space (see [3]
and [11]), and let % denote the decision makers preference relation over A. In [10], Ghirardato,
Maccheroni and Marinacci isolated a core common to several theories of decision making. This
consists of the ve axioms listed below.
A1 % is complete and transitive.
A2 (C-independence) For all f; g 2 A and h 2 Ac and for all  2 (0; 1)
f  g () f + (1  )h  g + (1  )h
A3 (Archimedean property) For all f; g; h 2 A, if f  g and g  h then 9;  2 (0; 1) such that
f + (1  )h  g and g  f + (1  )h.
A4 (Monotonicity) For all f; g 2 A, f(s) % g(s) for any s 2 S =) f % g.
A5 (Non-degeneracy) 9x; y 2 X such that x  y.
Then, Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci observed that alternative sixth axioms correspond
to alternative theories of decision making. For instance, one obtains SEU, CEU and MEU as follows:
A6 (a) (SEU, Anscombe and Aumann [3]) For all f; g 2 A such that f  g, 12f + 12g  f ;
A6 (b) (CEU, Schmeidler [25]) For all f; g 2 A such that f  g, 12f + 12g  f if f and g are
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comonotonic;
A6 (c) (MEU, Gilboa and Schmeidler [13]) For all f; g 2 A such that f  g, 12f + 12f % f .
Thus, it appears that the point we are looking for lies at the end of the 5th axiom and before the
6th is imposed. The mathematical environment associated with the rst ve axioms is completely
characterized by Theorem 1 below, which was proved in [2, Theorems 1 and 2]. In order to state
it, we need to introduce the notation that we will be using throughout the paper.
Notation: The set of bounded, -measurable functions (S;)  ! R equipped with the sup-
norm is denoted by B(). Its dual ba(), the space of bounded charges on , is always endowed
with the weak*-topology produced by the duality (ba(); B()). The subset of ba() consisting
of the nitely additive probability measures on  is denoted by ba+1 (). For C a weak*-compact,
convex subset of ba+1 (), a weak*-continuous a¢ ne function C  ! R is of the form  f (P ) =
Z
S
fdp,
P 2 C, for some f 2 B(). The space of all weak*-continuous a¢ ne functions on C equipped with
the sup-norm is denoted by A(C). The mapping  : f 7 !  f is the canonical linear mapping
 : B()  ! A(C). The Borel -algebra on C is denoted by B, and B(B) denotes the space of
bounded, B-measurable functions C  ! R equipped with the sup-norm. Finally, the set of regular
Borel measures on C is denoted by P(C).
We can now state the theorem characterizing Axioms 1 to 5. Recall that Axioms 1 to 5 imply
that there exist a utility function u : X  ! R and a functional I : B()  ! R such that for
~f; ~g 2 A (see [13] and [10], for details)
~f % ~g iff I(u  ~f)  I(u  ~g)
For notational simplicity, throughout the paper we are going to identify an act ~f 2 A with the
corresponding function u  ~f = f 2 B().
Theorem 1 (Amarante [2]) A preference relation % on A satises Axioms 1 to 5 i¤ for any
f 2 B() the functional I representing it can be written as
I(f) =
Z
C
(f)d =
Z
C
Z
S
fdPd(P )
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where C is a convex, weak*-compact subset of ba+1 () and  is a capacity on the Borel subsets of C.
Intuitively, Theorem 1 tells us that any behavior satisfying Axioms 1 to 5 corresponds to an
integration over priors when this operation is performed in the sense of Choquet.
3 Information
In line with Bayesian statistics, a decision maker who follows Axioms 1 to 5 entertains several prob-
abilistic descriptions of the world, each represented by a probability in the set C. He, then, weights
these probabilistic descriptions by using a possibly non-additive set function , thus obtaining a
possibly non-probabilistic criterion for evaluating his alternatives. As we have seen, it is at this
point that we have to plug in information, and determine whether or not the decision maker can
be Bayesian. As it is customary, we are going to model information as a partition of the set C.
The partition and the associated sub -eld (that is, the -eld generated by the partition) convey
that the decision maker has only partial information about C. This corresponds to the following
situation (see Billingsley [5], pp. 57-58 and pp. 427-29): on the basis of his information, the de-
cision maker can construct a statistical experiment whose outcome would tell him (in a statistical
sense) in which element of the partition the true probabilistic description lies. He would not be
able, however, to construct on the basis of his information an experiment capable of distinguishing
among probabilistic descriptions lying in the same cell of the partition. While this is a valuable
interpretation, the reader should be cautioned that it is subject to the qualications that we will
discuss in Sections 5 and 7. Aside from information about the true probabilistic description of the
world, the decision maker may also have information about the true state of the world. Clearly,
this type of information (that is, information of the form "the true state belongs to the set A  S")
can always be trivially expressed as information about the set C.1 The following denition records
formally the concept of information structure.
Denition 2 An information structure on (C;B) is a triple f(C;B); I;BIg, where I is a partition
of C and BI is the sub-eld of B generated by I.
1 It is interesting to notice that departures from SEU are often associated with the decision maker being given
information explicitly about the set C of probabilities on (S;). This is the case, for instance, in both Ellsbergs
experiments (the congurations of the urns) as well as in those of Gardenfors and Sahlin [9] (the ability of the players).
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Before we begin our inquiry into the properties of possible information structures, a renement
of this denition is needed. We have been pursuing the idea that at the point we are at - the one
ideally lying between Axiom 5 and Axiom 6 - the decision maker tries to be Bayesian: it is only the
type of information that he gets at this point that might prevent him from being so. But, if the
information is good enough he will adhere to SEU. It is clear that for this to happen, the decision
maker must have a probability on the set C. Informally, this corresponds to the integration over
priors argument that in traditional Bayesian statistics leads to the determination of the "predictive"
(see [20] and [2, Sec. 3.1]): Given his prior  on C and the partition I, the decision maker computes
a collection of conditional probabilities, one for each element of the partition; then, he averages
these conditionals with the weights that  gives to the corresponding elements of the partition, and
SEU obtains. Thus, the existence of the prior  is a necessary condition for the decision maker
to be Bayesian. Since this prior also contains some form of information available to the decision
maker, it must be explicitly encoded in the formal denition of information structure:
Denition 3 A Bayesian information structure on (C;B) is a quadruple f(C;B); ; I;BIg, where
 is a regular Borel measure on (C;B), I is a partition of C and BI is the sub-eld of B generated
by I.
Possibly, if the Ambiguity idea holds, the existence of a prior on C is not su¢ cient for SEU to
obtain, but that remains to be determined. In the meantime, let it be clear that no extra assumption
has been made with Denition 3. In particular, it has not been assumed that the capacity in
Theorem 1 is actually a measure. As said, the introduction of Bayesian information structures as
in Denition 3 is necessary to guarantee that SEU would obtain whenever the information is good.
In fact, by using Denition 3 and noticing that no information explicitly appears either in Theorem 1
or in any of the classical representation theorems in decision making under uncertainty, we can now
(informally) re-formulate our working hypothesis as If the Ambiguity idea is correct, then Bayesian
integration over priors with bad information must be representable by a non-additive integral. In
other words, the poor quality of the information must reveal itself into the non-additivity of the
integral representing the decision makers preference.
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Remark 4 (F) Later in the paper, Corollary 30 will formally prove that the intuition
Lebesgue integration w/ bad information = non-additive integration
is, indeed, correct.
Another brief comment concerns the requirement that the measure in Denition 3 be regular
Borel. This is motivated by the structure of the problem and is without loss of generality.2 In fact,
by allowing for a wider class of measures, we would only strengthen our results (see footnote 5, Sec.
8).
4 Sometimes, the information is ....
Given a Bayesian information structure f(C;B); ; I;BIg, the integration over priors procedure
supposedly leads to behavior conforming to SEU theory. For this to be true, two conditions must
be met. Let figi2I be a system of probability measures, one for each element of the partition I.
Then, 8' 2 B(B) we must have:
1. The function  (i) : C=I  ! R dened by
 (i) =
Z
C\i
' j d
is a measurable function with respect to the canonical -eld on C=I (see Appendix A); and
2. Z
C
'd =
Z
C=I
Z

' j dd0
where 0 is the pushforward of  under the canonical projection  : C  ! C=I (see Appendix
A).
2When the preference is SEU, the functional on B() which represents it is linear and sup-norm continuous. Thus,
the integration over priors argument must dene a sup-norm continuous, linear functional dened on the space A(C)
of continuous a¢ ne a¢ ne functions on C. By Hahn-Banach, this functional can be extended to a sup-norm continuous
linear functional on C(C), the Banach space of all continuous functions on C equipped with the sup-norm, and (via
the Riesz representation theorem) there exists a unique regular Borel measure representing it, that is  2 P(C).
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The exact formal meaning of these conditions is fully spelled out in Appendix A. They are,
however, nothing other than the formal transposition of the integration over priors argument. To see
this, let us start from condition 2. The part stating that 0 is the pushforward of  under  simply
means that the weights assigned to the cells of the partitions are those determined by . Next,
let us consider the inner integral on the RHS of condition 2. This is exactly the function  that
appears in Condition 1. If the family figi2I has to represent a family of conditional probabilities,
then the function  (i) : C=I  ! R describes precisely the association cell of the partition  !
conditional evaluation of ' at that cell of the partition. Then, the equality in Condition 2. states
that things "add up" properly: that is, if for any ' 2 B(B) we take all of its conditional evaluations
and average them with the weights determined by , we obtain the unconditional evaluation of '.
This condition is even more transparent when we take ' = A, the indicator function of a set
A 2 B. In such a case, the condition states that if we take A, "cut" it by using the elements of
the partition, measure the pieces separately and then add them up, we obtain the original measure
(A). To complete the assessment of Conditions 1. and 2., notice that Condition 1. is necessary to
even state Condition 2. as in order to take the integral on the RHS of 2., the function that is being
integrated has, obviously, to be measurable. Condition 1., however, has a very substantial meaning
as well: it expresses that the type of information available to the decision maker is su¢ cient both
to evaluate his options in the various contingencies he can distinguish (the cells of the partition)
and to understand how these evaluations relate to one another. We conclude this section by giving
one example of a partition (hence, of an information structure) for which the two conditions hold.
Example 5 Let I be the partition of C generated by the equivalence relation
P  Q iff P = Q
and let f(C;B); ; I;BIg be the corresponding information structure. In such a case, the RHS of 2.
is given by
R
C
'd and thus 2. becomes a tautology. Moreover, for this partition, we have C = C=I
and ' 2 B(B) is the same as saying that 1. is satised. Thus, each ' 2 B(B) is evaluated by
Z
C
'd
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Finally, the evaluation of each f 2 B() is achieved by integrating over priors, that is by means of
the functional
I(f) =
Z
C
(f)d =
Z
C
Z
S
fdPd(P )
On the weak*-compact, convex set C, each  has a unique barycenter [22, Proposition 1.1] P  2 C,
and we have that
I(f) =
Z
C
(f)d = (f)(P ) =
Z
S
fdP 
for every f 2 B(), which is the SEU functional.
Obviously, this conclusion is far from being surprising. The partition in the example is the nest
possible partition of C, hence it represents the best possible information for the decision maker. We
should have expected the Bayesian integration over priors argument to go through at least in this
case. For future reference, we record this formally in the corollary below.
Corollary 6 If the information available to a Bayesian decision maker is the best possible, then
behavior conforming to SEU theory obtains.
5 ... not enough to rely on a single probability
Now, we have to address the question of whether or not there exist information structures in
correspondence of which the integration over priors procedure fails to lead to behavior conforming
to SEU theory. Theorem 8 of this section answers the question in the a¢ rmative. In what follows,
we are going to make an assumption, which greatly simplies the exposition. We are going to
assume that the set of priors C of Theorem 1 is a Polish space. This assumption is fairly minor
(for instance, it is automatically satised any time that C is nite dimensional) and it is possible
to dispense with it but, as said, at the price of a cumbersome exposition. At any rate, in order
to dissipate any doubt about the axiomatic foundations of our work, in Appendix C we show that
the assumption is satised whenever the decision makers preference relation satises the axiom of
Monotone Continuity (see Appendix C ).3
3The original monotone continuity axiom was introduced by Arrow in [4], who comments "the assumption of
Monotone Continuity seems, I believe correctly, to be the harmless simplication almost inevitable in the formalization
of any real-life problem"
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The key concept in Theorem 8 below is that of Rokhlins non-measurable partition [23]. We
stress that the concept refers to a property of the partition as a whole and not to a property of the
sets making up the partition which might as well be measurable sets.
Denition 7 (Rokhlin [23]) Let (L;; ) be a Lebesgue space (see Appendix B), and let I be a
partition of L. Let the quotient L=I be endowed with the measure structure induced by the canonical
projection (see Appendix A). The quotient L=I is said to be countably separated if there exists a
countable family of measurable subsets of L=I which separates points. The partition I is called
measurable if L=I is countably separated.
Theorem 8 Let f(C;B); ; I;BIg be a Bayesian information structure on (C;B). Assume that the
prior  is not purely atomic and that  is not supported by a single cell of the partition. Then,
SEU obtains if and only if the partition I of C is measurable.
Notice that the assumption that  is not supported by a single cell of the partition is clearly
necessary for the conclusion in the theorem. In fact, if  is supported by a single cell, then (modulo
sets of -measure 0) the partition consists of a single element, and we are back to the case examined
at the end of the previous section where SEU obtains trivially.
Proof. By the assumption that  is not purely atomic,  can be expressed as the product of a
purely atomic measure and a non-atomic one. Since a system of conditional measures of a purely
atomic measure always exists, we can assume without loss that  is non-atomic. If I is measurable,
then by Rokhlins Theorem [23] there exists a canonical system of conditional probabilities fg2I .
By using Denition 42 (Appendix A), it is straightforward to check that for every ' 2 B(B) both
Conditions 1. and 2. of Section 4 are satised. Thus, every f 2 B() is evaluated by R
C
(f)d
and the SEU functional obtains by means of the barycenter argument exactly as in the example in
Section 4.
Conversely, let I be a nonmeasurable partition, and let fg2I be a system of conditional
probabilities, with each  a non-atomic measure on . By Rokhlins theorem, fg2I cannot be
canonical. Hence, 9' 2 B(B) such that at least one of Conditions 1. and 2. of Section 4 is violated.
If such a ' belongs to range (B()), then we are done for in such a case there exists at least one
f 2 B() that cannot be evaluated by a SEU functional. Now, we are going to show that range
(B()) necessarily contains at least one such '.
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To begin, observe that the (non-canonical) system of conditional probabilities fg2I denes
an operator ~T : B(B)  ! RC=I by
 7! ~T ( ) where ~T ( )() =
Z
C
 d
Also, observe that supp  . Let
 =
8><>: 2 B(B) j (a) ~T ( ) 2 B(B=I); (b)
Z
C
 d =
Z
C=I
Z

 j dd0
9>=>;
By using standard arguments, it is easily checked (see for instance [1], Ch. 13) that  is a linear
subspace and a lattice. Now, let f ngn2N be a sequence in ;
CLAIM: If either  n %  2 B(B) or  n &  2 B(B), then  2 .
Proof of the claim: Let  n %  2 B(B).
(a) By the Dominated Convergence Theorem (DCT), for every  we have
R
C
 nd %
R
C
 d,
that is ~T ( n) % ~T ( ). Hence, ~T ( ) is a pointwise limit of measurable functions, and hence
measurable. Moreover, since  2 B(B), ~T ( ) is bounded, i.e. ~T ( ) 2 B(B=I).
(b) Observe that
Z
C
 d = lim
n!1
Z
C
 nd (by the DCT and  2 B(B))
= lim
n!1
Z
C=I
Z

 ndd
0 (because  n 2 )
= lim
n!1
Z
C=I
~T ( n)d
0
=
Z
C=I
~T ( )d0 (by (a) and the DCT )
=
Z
C=I
Z

 j dd0
which completes the proof for the case  n %  . The other case is similar.
Now suppose, by the way of contradiction, that range (B())  . Let K denote the set of
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continuous, convex functions on C. Then, if  2 K there exists ([22], p. 19) fmgm2N  A(C) 
range (B()) and a sequence fngn2N, with n = ^figki=1, such that n % . The sequence
fng   because  is a lattice. Then, by the above claim,  2 , that is K  . Since  is a
linear space, it follows that K  K  . By the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, K  K is uniformly
dense in C(C), the set of continuous functions on C. Since C is a metric space, for any closed set
A  C, there exists ([1], Corollary 3.14) fngn2N  C(C) such that n & A, where A denotes
the indicator function of A. Since K  K is uniformly dense in C(C), for each n 2 N, there exists
fhnkgk2N  K  K such that hnk ! n uniformly as k !1. Now, let k0 2 N be such that
0(P )  1 < h0k0(P ) < 0(P ) + 1 ; 8P 2 C
Then, the function
g0 = h0k0 + 2
is in  because  is a linear space, and satises
0(P ) + 1 < g0(P ) < 0(P ) + 3 ; 8P 2 C
Next, let k1 2 N be such that
1(P )  1
3
< h1k1(P ) < 1(P ) +
1
3
; 8P 2 C
Then, g1 = h1k1 +
2
3 2  and satises
1(P ) +
1
3
< g1(P ) < 1(P ) + 1 8P 2 C
Moreover, for every P 2 C, we have
g1(P ) < 1(P ) + 1  0(P ) + 1 < g0(P )
Inductively, dene
gn = hnkn +
2
3n
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Then, fgngn2N  , gn+1(P ) < gn(P ) 8P 2 C, and
sup
P2C
jgn(P )  n(P )j < 1
3n 1
Now, the inequality
jgn(P )  A(P )j  jgn(P )  n(P )j+ jn(P )  A(P )j
shows that gn & A. [Notice that gn(P ) > n(P ) + 13n  A(P )]
By the above claim, we then have A 2  for any closed set A  C. Next, observe that:
(i) C 2  because the function 1 2 A(C)  ;
(ii) if A; B 2  and A  B, then BnA = B   A 2  because  is a linear space;
(iii) if An % A and

An
	  , then An % A and A 2  by the claim above.
Hence, we conclude that D = fA 2 C j A 2 g is a Dynkin system, which contains all closed
sets. Hence, D = B (the Borel -algebra generated by the topology on C). But now, it follows that
 contains all the simple functions (because  is a linear space) and since f ng   and  n %  
imply  2 , we conclude that  = B(B), a contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 8 shows that the failure SEU theory manifests itself into possible ways:
either for some f 2 B() the function ~T ((f))() =
Z
C
(f)d is not measurable, which indi-
cates that the decision maker has not enough information to evaluate f 2 B(); or R
C
(f)d 6=R
C=I
R

(f) j dd0, which indicates that the decision maker cannot come up with a consistent eval-
uation of that f . By Theorem 8, this is going to happen whenever the prior  has a nonatomic part
and the partition I is nonmeasurable. We will comment on these features extensively in Section 7.
6 Examples
This section contains some examples of information structures for which SEU fails. As the inter-
pretation of these examples and of their mathematical properties requires a thorough discussion,
some explanations will be postponed until the next section. Those readers mainly interested in the
emergence of non-EU theories may jump to Section 8, and possibly come back to these sections
later.
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6.1 Uncertainty on the class of measure zero events
Let (S;) be a Standard Borel Space (see Appendix B) and let ca+1 () denote the set of countably
additive probability measures on . The rst information structure that we consider has an obvious
relevance to any theory of decision making. It consists of partitioning the set of measures on 
so that two measures are in the same cell of the partition if and only if they are associated to the
same collection of measure zero events in S. For P;Q 2 ca+1 () this partition is dened by the
equivalence relation
PZQ iff P  Q and Q P
where  stands for absolute continuity, and two measures are equivalent if and only if they are
mutually absolutely continuous. Notice that all cells in this partition are measurable (wrt the Borel
-algebra generated by the weak*-topology on ca+1 ()). Informally, the information described by
the partition Z corresponds to statements like The class of measure zero events in  is either 
or 	, etc..
Theorem 9 (see Kechris and Sofronidis [17]) The partition Z is nonmeasurable.
As an immediate consequence, we have
Corollary 10 Let the decision makers information be given by the quadruple f(C;B); ;Z;BZg,
where Z is the partition produced by the measure equivalence relation. Assume that  contains a
non-atomic part. Then, SEU obtains if and only if the decision maker is a priori certain about the
class of measure zero events of S.
In other words, if the only information available to the decision maker regards the class of
measure zero events, and if the decision maker is uncertain about this class (his prior on C is not
concentrated on a single equivalence class), then the decision maker cannot be Bayesian.
6.2 Ellsbergs three-color urn experiment
In this subsection, we consider Ellsbergs three-color urn experiment. Ellsbergs two-urn experiment
is suitable of similar considerations. In the three-color urn experiment, a decision maker faces bets
whose domain is an urn containing 90 balls. He is told that 30 of those are red (R) while the
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remaining are either black (B) or yellow (Y ) in unknown proportions. The following violation of
the SEU paradigm is often observed
R  B
but
R [ Y  B [ Y
That is, the decision maker prefers betting on red rather than black, but he prefers betting on
"black or yellow" rather than "red or yellow". Two aspects of the experiment are worth stressing:
First, the decision maker explicitly receives information about the set of possible congurations
of the urn; second, the information he receives is symmetric with respect to the labels B and Y .
What is mostly interesting about the experiment is that, in correspondence of the symmetry in the
information, one typically observes a strong symmetry in the decision makers table of preferences:
one can replace B with Y (and vice versa) in the table of preferences without changing the table
itself. We believe that this could hardly be considered an accident. In order to follow up on this
idea, we must nd a way of properly modeling the notion of symmetry encoded in the information
as well as that of symmetry in the corresponding behavior.
6.2.1 Modeling the symmetry in the information
The set of possible congurations of the urn corresponds to the set C in Theorems 1 and 8. In this
section, we are going to look for an alternative, yet equivalent, representation of that set, one that
would allow us to clearly express the symmetry encoded in the information given to the decision
maker. A conguration of the urn can be thought of as a measure on a set S of 90 points, that
is a vector with 90 coordinates. S is partitioned into three subsets called R, B and Y . Let us
x an arbitrary conguration p0. An arbitrary conguration represented by some vector pi can be
expressed in terms of p0 as there exists a matrix Ai such that pi = Aip0. Thus, the congurations
of the urn can be identied to a set of (stochastic) matrices, with p0 being associated to the identity
matrix. We are interested in the relation existing among matrices (i.e., congurations) that can
be obtained from one another by means of relabeling of the underlying set S. Here, the idea is
that since there is nothing substantial about the labels (the information is exactly the same if we
replace B with Y and vice versa), it is impossible to distinguish among these matrices.
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A relabeling of S is a bijection t : S  ! S. This is evidently associated with the matrix Pt
which changes the probabilities according to the relabeling t. So, when we apply the relabeling t, we
transform the conguration p0 into the conguration Ptp0; and, by applying the matrix A to this,
we obtain the conguration APtp0. Consider now another conguration, say Bp0, and let us apply
the same relabeling t, thus obtaining the conguration PtBp0. If it turns out that PtB = APt,
we conclude that the two congurations represented by A and B are e¤ectively indistinguishable
because one can be obtained from the other by means of a relabeling of the underlying space.
Summing up,
Denition 11 Two congurations of the urn are the same up to a relabeling of the underlying set
S if the corresponding matrices, A and B, are permutation-similar, that is if there is a permutation
matrix Pt such that B = P 1t APt.
Remark 12 Possibly, the ner relation of unitary equivalence (obtained by requiring that the ma-
trix Pt in denition be a unitary matrix) is more appropriate since it preserves also the structure of
the underlying space of bets, which is what the decision maker ultimately cares about. This issue,
however, is inconsequential to the remainder of the argument and, therefore, we leave it as is.
In the next subsection, we are going to study a continuous version of Ellsbergs experiment. We
will go back to the nite version in Subsection 6.4.
6.3 A continuous version
Here, the urn is the interval [0; 1], which we should think of as partitioned into three subsets, labeled
R, B and Y . The set of bets is the set of all indicator functions E , where E 2  and  is the usual
Borel -algebra. The set of possible congurations of the urn is the set of non-atomic measures on
([0; 1];), which we denote by N ([0; 1]). Thus, a conguration P 2 N ([0; 1]) corresponds to the
measure space ([0; 1];; P ), which under our assumptions is a Lebesgue space (Appendix B). By
xing a possible conguration as a reference point, say ([0; 1];; P0), the Isomorphism Theorem
for Lebesgue Spaces (see Appendix B) allows us to identify each conguration ([0; 1];; Pi) with
an invertible measure preserving transformation gi : ([0; 1];; P0)  ! ([0; 1];; Pi). Thus, the set
of all possible congurations of the urn can be identied to the group G = Aut(P0) of invertible
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measure preserving transformations of ([0; 1];; P0). The notion of symmetry of two congurations
of the urn is expressed by the following denition.
Denition 13 Two congurations, g1 and g2 in G, are the same up to a relabeling of the underlying
space, and we write g1  g2, if there exists a t 2 G such that g1 = tg2t 1.
Thus the decision makers information consists of the partition generated by this equivalence
relation along with a nonatomic prior on G, which species that only those measure spaces
([0; 1];; Pi) such that Pi(R) = 1=3 should be considered. Notice that all the cells of the par-
tition are measurable sets (for the measurable structure on G induced by the mapping Pi 7 ! gi).
Theorem 14 (see Hjorth [15, Theorem 1.2]) The partition associated to the equivalence rela-
tion in Denition 13 is nonmeasurable.
From this, just like in the previous subsection, it follows that
Corollary 15 If the decision makers prior over G contains a non-atomic part and if the prior is
not concentrated on a single equivalence class, then SEU fails.
6.4 The nite version
As we saw above, the nite case is similar to the continuous one. Some extra consideration is
needed, nonetheless. In the nite case, a measure is a vector in Rn and the usual measurable
structure (Borel) on the set of measures is the one generated by the Euclidean topology on Rn.
This has the inconvenient feature of producing "oversized" information. There is no reasonable
presumption, however, that the Borel structure on Rn be representative of the decision makers
information in Ellsbergs experiment. In fact, the opposite is true as we shall argue below. For the
time being, Corollary 16 will give us some su¢ cient conditions for the failure of SEU theory.
Corollary 16 Let C be endowed with a -algebra such that (at least one of) the cells of the partition
produced by the relation of permutation similarity of stochastic matrices are not measurable sets.
Then, the partition is nonmeasurable. If the decision makers prior contains a non-atomic part and
if the prior is not concentrated on a single equivalence class, then SEU fails.
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A basic result in Linear Algebra tells us that in order to show that two matrices are not
similar, we need enough information to be able to show that they have di¤erent Frobenius normal
forms. Consequently, we need even more information to distinguish between permutation non-
similar congurations in Ellsbergs experiment. To see what this entails, let us consider a simpler
problem, that of distinguishing between di¤erent points in Rn. If we had this ability, we could,
for instance, determine that certain matrices are not similar because they have di¤erent sets of
eigenvalues. It is clear that it is always possible to distinguish between di¤erent points in Rn if
we know the Borel -algebra on Rn as, for any given two points in Rn, this contains a set which
contains one point but not the other. The Borel -algebra is generated by the cylinder sets
fx = (x1; x2; :::; xn) 2 Rn j xi = yi; 1  i  g
That is, a cylinder set is obtained by xing the rst  coordinates, and the class of all cylinder sets
obtains as  varies between 1 and n. To endow the decision maker in Ellsbergs experiment with
this -algebra would imply, for instance, the following. Let P1 and P2 be two possible congurations
of the urn, that is two measures on S, both supported by 89 points but with supp (P1) 6=supp (P2).
Then, the decision maker would always be able to distinguish between P1 and P2, as he would be able
(by using a a property of a set which contains P1 but not P2) to construct a statistical experiment
whose outcome would tell him which was the true measure. Yet, in the actual experiment there is
nothing suggesting that he would be able to do so. That is, his information must be coarser than
that represented by the class generated by all cylinder sets. Consider now a subclass of that class,
which is obtained by allowing  to vary only between 1 and m, where m < n. Let Bm denote the
-algebra on C which is generated by this subclass. It is clear that this -algebra does not separate
points (that is, there exist two points in Rn such that no set in the -algebra contains one but not
the other). Thus, if all we know about Rn is this -algebra, we cannot distinguish between points
and, hence, between non-similar matrices. In fact, for all choices of m < n, these -algebras satisfy
the condition in Corollary 16. In the next section, we will discuss extensively the meaning of the
-algebra, its interpretation and the role it plays in the failure of SEU theory. We will revisit all
three examples of this section in Section 9 and in Section 10.3.
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7 Comments: the idea of insu¢ cient information
"A person behind a door slips a blank paper through the door. Is that person a male or a female?".
"The eye witness of a robbery describes the perpetrator as a male, wearing a mask and gloves,
medium built, medium height. Is he 56" tall or 59"? Does he weight 140 lbs or 160 lbs? Does
he have a beard? Is he white, black, Asian?". These are examples of insu¢ cient information:
on the basis of the information that you have, you can make certain distinctions but you still
lack information on so many fundamental aspects of the problem that you can only come up with
very coarse, almost useless, distinctions. In the second example, for instance, you know that the
perpetrator is not a female, that is neither very tall nor very short, neither very heavy nor very
light, but clearly there is a lot more you need to know to form an even remote idea of where
to begin the search for the perpetrator. In the rst example, you do know that the person is
either a male or a female, but you will never be able to either check that or to form meaningful
probabilistic assessments about that unless some other information is revealed (for instance, you
write questions on that piece of paper and slip it back through the door, the person behind the door
starts talking etc.). As another example, suppose that I am subject to a technological constraints
that allows me to check fractional numbers only up to the tenth digit. Once I know that the number
is 3.1415926535, do I conclude that the number is rational or that it is irrational? This is what
insu¢ cient information means in practice, and this is precisely what the mathematical concept of
nonmeasurable partition conveys: if my information is described by a nonmeasurable partition I do
not know enough to tell things apart.
In order to get a thorough understanding of why the concept of nonmeasurable partition is
the mathematical translation of the intuitive idea of insu¢ cient information, we must somehow
return to the basics and keep in mind that the words subset and property are interchangeable (as,
by the denition, a subset is the collection of all points having a certain property). For C the set
of measures, let I be a partition of C and let  : C  ! C=I be the canonical projection. Let us
begin with an extreme case, which will make certain features more transparent. Let us suppose
that the decision maker understands nothing about the set of measures. This situation of absolute
ignorance is represented by the decision maker having the trivial -algebra f?; Cg on C (that is, the
decision maker knows no properties). In such a case, the -algebra on the quotient that makes the
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canonical projection measurable is again the trivial -algebra f?; C=Ig and the only measurable
functions on the quotient are the constant functions. It follows that any non-trivial partition on C
will generate, given any system of conditional probabilities, many nonmeasurable functions on the
quotient (Condition 1. in Sec. 4 is violated) and SEU theory must fail. In a manner of speaking,
given his (lack of) understanding of C, the decision maker cannot handle partitions other than the
trivial one. It is clear that the ner the algebra on C, the more partitions the decision maker will be
able to handle. This is only one part of the story, though. As we have seen in the rst two examples
of the previous section, even when the algebra on C is ne enough to guarantee that the partition
is made only of measurable sets, it is still possible that SEU would fail. This has to do with the
fact that while the sets making up the partition are measurable (and, hence, "simple" enough when
considered in isolation), the partition as a whole is "too complicated" for the decision maker to
be able to assign (non-trivial) measures to those sets. In other words, the nonmeasurability of a
partition is either a statement that the decision maker does not fully understand the objects making
up the partition or that, while he understands those objects one by one, he is unable to come up
with coherent assessments on the whole. Intuitively, whether or not a partition is measurable
depends on the comparison between "how complicated the partition is" relative to the decision
makers knowledge ("how many properties he knows of"). Thus, nonmeasurability of a partition
can be achieved by either complicating the partition or by reducing the amount of properties that
the decision maker knows of.
When we want to distinguish a point x from a point y, short of knowing x with absolute
certainty (which corresponds to the atomic case, hence the nonatomicity condition encountered in
Theorem 8), the minimal condition is that of knowing an open set that contains x and does not
contain y. This is the same as saying that x is di¤erent from y because x has a property that y
does not have (the one associated with that open set). When x and y are points in Rn, we can
distinguish between them when we know the Euclidean topology of Rn, but if we are limited only
to the projections on the rst n  1 coordinates, this is no longer possible. This is what is going on
in the third example of the previous section as well as in the rational vs irrational number question
above. The explanation is a bit di¤erent in the rst two examples of the previous section, but the
spirit is similar. As said above, those examples express situations where the partition is, intuitively
speaking, too complicated. Formally, what is going on is as follows: for any point x 2 C, any open
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set around x intersects all equivalence classes. In other words, there is no property that the decision
maker knows of that would allow him to distinguish among equivalence classes. Thus, either he is
able to distinguish among points at the outset (which is the purely atomic case) or he does not need
to distinguish between equivalence classes (because his prior is concentrated on a single equivalence
class) or he would not be able to assign weights to the equivalence classes (because as soon as he
assigns a weight to a certain property he would assign that weight to all the equivalence classes;
ultimately this would result in inconsistent evaluations).4
We conclude this discussion by stressing, once more, that the failure of SEU is determined by
the interplay between the -algebra (= the decision makers knowledge) and the partition (= the
decision makers information, given his knowledge). This is a necessary feature which accounts for
two important aspects of the intuitive idea of ambiguity; namely, (a) the ambiguity that is perceived
in a decision problem may vary across di¤erent individuals; and (b) for the same individual, the
perceived ambiguity may vary across decision problems. This is intuitively clear. A question of the
type Does there exist an extension of this functional satisfying such and such property?" may
bear no ambiguity to a trained mathematician while appearing utterly obscure to the untrained
person. At the same time, the very same mathematician might nd himself/herself at a loss when
facing the statement "for this type of shot, this type of club is better than that other type".
8 Ambiguity: a formal denition
We can now summarize our ndings by means of the following denition. Let C be a set of measures
on (S;), T a -algebra of subsets of C, I a partition of C and let TI be the -algebra on the quotient
induced by the canonical projection.
Denition 17 A decision maker faces Ambiguity (or Knightian Uncertainty) whenever his infor-
mation about the set C is described by a quadruple f(C; T ); ; I; TIg (see Denition 3) with the
following properties:
(i)  contains a non-atomic part;
4Hopefully, the discussion in this and the previous section has not generated the erroneous idea that nonmeasurable
partitions made exclusively of measurable sets do not exist in nite dimension. In fact, these partitions exist even in
the one-dimensional case. An example is given by the unit interval equipped with its usual Lebesgue structure and
by the partition of the unit interval produced by the equivalence relation x  y if and only if y = x +  (mod 1),
where  is a xed irrational number (see [6]).
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(ii)  is not concentrated on a single equivalence class;
(iii) the partition I (modulo -measure zero events) is non-measurable.
In correspondence to all other information structures, the decision maker faces (Knightian)
Risk.
The necessity and the meaning of all three conditions was explained in the previous section.
Theorem 8 can now be reformulated as follows: If the decision maker faces Ambiguity, then he
cannot obey the SEU paradigm.5
By means of Denition 17, we can partition the set of all (Bayesian) information structures
into two subsets: one represents those information structures which describe good information, and
corresponds to situations of Risk; the other represents those information structures which describe
information which is not good, and corresponds to situations of Ambiguity. A Bayesian decision
maker obeys SEU theory when he faces Risk, and departs from it when he faces Ambiguity.
With this, we have completed the rst part of our program: we have shown that Ambiguity
exists, we have formally identied those situations that should be deemed as ambiguous, and we
have shown that departures from SEU must be observed in these situations. In the next section,
we move to the second part of our program, that of showing which non-EU theories might emerge
in situations of Ambiguity.
9 Subjectively measurable acts
In this section, we are going to isolate a subset of the acts: those that the decision maker is able to
evaluate on the basis of his information and for which an expected utility functional (determined
by the decision makers prior ) can be meaningfully dened. We call them subjectively measurable
acts. In the next section, we will study the problem of extending the expected utility functional on
the subjectively measurable acts to the set of all acts in a way that respects the decision makers
information. It will be at that point that non-EU behavior will emerge.
5As anticipated at the end of Section 3, the considerations of nitely additive priors only strenghtens our ndings.
In fact, if a prior  over C is nitely additive but not countably additive, then by denition there exists a partition
I and a function  2 B(B) such that R
C
 d 6= R
C=I
R

 j dd0. It su¢ ces to consider a partition I = fA; fBigi2Ng
where fBigi2N is a family of disjoint sets for which  fails countable additivity. Thus, existence of non-measurable
partitions is a rather easy matter when we allow for measures that are only nitely additive.
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Let f(C;B); ; I;BIg be an ambiguous information structure (that is, the properties in Denition
17 are satised) and let cp = fg2I be a collection of probability measures with  supported by
 (viewed as a subset of C). As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 8, the family cp = fg2I
cannot be a system of canonical condition probabilities and, therefore, cannot be used to evaluate
all acts. Yet, the family cp may display a partial compatibility (possibly trivial) with the decision
makers information, and can be used to form at least some conditional evaluations. Precisely,
given an information structure and a family of probabilities cp = fg2I , a subset of the acts may
satisfy the two conditions of Section 4. This is the set of subjectively measurable acts determined
by cp, which we denote by MA(cp). Recall that, as in the proof of Theorem 8, an act f 2 B()
and a system of probabilities cp = fg2I induce a function  f : C=I  ! R which is dened by
 f () =
Z
C
(f)d, where as usual  is the canonical mapping B()  ! A(C). Thus (see Sec. 5),
the set of subjectively measurable acts is given by
MA(cp) =
8><>:f 2 B() j (a)  f is measurable; (b)
Z
C
(f)d =
Z
C=I
Z

(f) j dd0
9>=>; (1)
When the information structure is ambiguous, the complement of this set in B() is non empty by
Theorem 8, and represents those acts that the decision maker cannot evaluate on the basis of his
information.
A few comments are in order. Firstly, the set of subjectively measurable acts depends, in
principle, on the system of probabilities cp. This is so because the choice of cp may a¤ect the
determination of which functions of the type  f are indeed measurable. Because of this feature, it
makes sense to consider, alongside with MA(cp), another class of acts, which we call the class of
unambiguously measurable acts and denote by UMA. This is dened as
UMA =
8<:f 2 B() j
Z
C
fdP =
Z
fdP 0 for all P; P 0 2 C
9=;
In Proposition 18 below, we shall see that these acts are precisely those that are subjectively
measurable irrespective of the choice of the system of conditional probabilities cp. Moreover, in
some important cases, for instance in the examples of Sec. 6, the properties of the nonmeasurable
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partition completely pin down the class of subjectively measurable acts and render it equal to
UMA. Part (6) of Proposition 18 below gives a condition for this to be the case. Secondly, it
is important to notice that if f 2 MA(cp), its evaluation does not depend on the choice of the
system cp but on the decision makers prior  only by virtue of condition (b) in the denition (the
same goes for the natural measure in the Proposition below). Finally, we should like to observe
that it is possible to allow for greater generality than we have done so far. In fact, one could replace
the family cp = fg2I with a family of functionals fVg which are to be interpreted as conditional
evaluations functionals. In such a case, the function  f above would be replaced by the function
~ f dened by ~ f () = V((f)), condition (a) by the condition that this function be measurable
and condition (b) by the condition
R
C
(f)d =
R
C=I
~ fd
0. The study of this case can be conducted
along the same lines. In particular, parts (3) to (6) of Proposition 18 below hold unchanged.
The subset of MA(cp) dened by
ME(cp) = fE 2 B() j E 2 MAg
is of special importance as it describes all the events in  to which the decision maker can assign
probabilities (Proposition 18, part (3) below). We call its elements the subjectively measurable
events determined by cp. Just like we did above, in parallel to ME(cp), we also introduce the
class of unambiguously measurable events, which is dened by
UME = fE 2 B() j E 2 UMAg
The basic properties of the classes MA(cp) and ME(cp) are stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 18 The following holds:
(1) MA(cp) is a linear space. Moreover, condition (b) in (1) denes the expected utility
functional E : MA(cp)  ! R by
E(f) =
Z
C
(f)d
(2) The class ME(cp) is non-empty and is a nite -system (i.e., is closed under complemen-
tation and nite disjoint unions);
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(3) There exists a natural measure N on ME(cp), dened by
N(E) =
Z
C
(E)d ; E 2 ME(cp)
where  is the decision makers prior on C. In fact, N is the restriction of E to ME(cp) (via the
identication E 7! E)
(4) UME  ME(cp) for every system cp; that is, UE  \
cp
ME(cp)
(5) UMA  \
cp
MA(cp)
(6) If there exists an ergodic nonatomic measure on the quotient C=I, then for every system of
probabilities cp we have
UMA = MA(cp) and UME = ME(cp)
Notice that the Proposition still holds in the Risk case, that is when the partition I is measur-
able. In such a case, if cp is canonical then SEU obtains, every event in  belongs to ME(cp),
every function in B() is in MA(cp), and the natural set function on  is the "average" mea-
sure obtained through the integration over priors theorem. In the Ambiguity case, the inclusions
MA(cp)  B() and ME(cp)   are always strict for any system of probabilities cp by
Theorem 8. The nal part of Proposition 18 is interesting because, as anticipated, it gives us a
condition guaranteeing that the set of subjectively measurable acts and events are independent of
the choice of the conditional probabilities. A nonatomic measure on the quotient C=I is ergodic if
the measure of any saturated set (= union of equivalence classes) is either 0 or 1. Existence of such
a measure is a property of the partition I and, as anticipated, it is satised in all the examples of
Section 6.
Proof. (1) Let cp = fg2I be a collection of probability measures with  supported by  (viewed
as a subset of C). For  2 B(B), let ~ : C=I  ! R be dened by ~ () =
Z
C
 d. As noted in the
proof of Theorem 8, the set
 =
8><>: 2 B(B) j (a) ~ is measurable; (b)
Z
C
 d =
Z
C=I
Z

 j dd0
9>=>;
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is a linear subspace of B(B). Since a function f 2 B() is subjectively measurable if and only if
(f) 2 , it follows that the class MA(cp) is the set  1((B()) \ ). From the linearity of
, it immediately follows that this is a linear subspace of B(). The second part of the statement
follows at once from the linearity and the positivity of the integral as well as the linearity of .
(2) From (1), it follows immediately that ME(cp) is closed under nite disjoint unions. More-
over, since constant functions always belong to ((B())\), the class ME(cp) always contains
? and S.
(3) E 2 ME(cp) implies
R
C
(E)d =
R
C=I
R

(E) j dd0. Hence, E 7 !
R
C
(E)d is an
additive set function on ME(cp).
(4)-(5)-(6) An act (event) f 2 B() (E 2 ) is unambiguously measurable i¤
Z
s
fdP =
Z
s
fdP 0
(P (E) = P 0(E)) for all P and P 0 in C, which means that the mapping (f) ((E)) is a constant
mapping on C. By (2), constant functions are always subjectively measurable, which proves the
inclusions in (4) and (5). Finally, if the condition in part (6) is satised, the only subjectively
measurable functions (modulo sets of measure 0) are constant and equality holds.
We conclude this section by determining the sets MA(cp) and ME(cp) in the aforementioned
examples. We also notice, by means of an example, that the determination of the set MA(cp)
permits us to derive a new object which, intuitively speaking, represents the understanding (or the
subjective view) that the decision maker has of the (objective) set of states.
Example 19 (Ex. Sec. 6.1 cntd) By [17], condition (6) in Proposition 18 is satised. Hence,
an act is subjectively measurable i¤ it is unambiguously measurable. It is easy to check that for
C = ca+1 (), MA contains constant functions only and, consequently, ME = f?; Sg.
Example 20 (Ex. Sec. 6.3 ctnd) By [15, Theorem 1.2], condition (6) in Proposition 18 is sat-
ised and an act is subjectively measurable i¤ it is unambiguously measurable. In this case, the set
ME = UME is given by
ME = UME = fE 2  j either E  R or E  Rcg
Hence,
MA = UMA =
  
lin fE j E 2 MEg
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where
   denotes the closed linear span of the set.
Example 21 (Ex. Sec. 6.4 ctnd) If we assume that all the cells of the partition are nonmea-
surable sets, as it would be the case if we use the -algebra at the end of Sec. 6.4, then the sets of
subjectively measurable acts and events are exactly as in the previous item.
Example 22 Consider a variation of the previous example where the state space S consists of only
3 points, labeled R, B and Y . The analysis of the example is essentially the same as in Sec. 6.4.
Then, by the previous item, the set MA is spanned by the indicator function of the point R and by
the indicator function of the complement of R in S. Thus, MA is the Euclidean space R2 while
the set of all acts is R3. E¤ectively, on the basis of his information, the decision maker can only
handle a two-point set of states while the actual one is a three-point set of states.
9.1 Unambiguous events in the sense of [10] and [21]
There is an apparent similarity between our unambiguously measurable events and the unam-
biguous events of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci [10] and of Nehring [21]: in both cases, the
unambiguous events are those that are assigned the same measures by all the probabilities in a cer-
tain set. The same observation applies to the comparison between our unambiguously measurable
acts and the crisp acts of [10]. In principle, however, these classes are di¤erent because the sets of
probability measures intervening in their denition need not be the same. Obviously, a relation is
to be expected; we will look into it in Section 11.
10 Foundations of non-EU theories
In our inquiry into the role played by Information in problems of decision making under uncertainty,
we have been led to consider Bayesian decision makers who want to integrate over a set of priors.
When the information is ambiguous, this operation is not possible and, consequently, there are
acts that cannot be evaluated. Only a subset of the acts can be evaluated by using an expected
utility functional. Thus, the problem of determining the behavior of these decision makers becomes
that of extending this functional to the set of all acts in a way that respects the decision makers
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information. We study this problem in the present section. Its solution will give us the class of
non-EU theories that emerge as a response to Ambiguity.
We should like to stress, once again, that this extension must respect the decision makers infor-
mation. This means that no additional information, aside from that contained in the information
structure originally available, can be used in the extension from the set of subjectively measurable
acts to the set of all acts. In other words, an extension obtained by requiring that a certain property,
say , be satised is legit (and meaningful) only if the decision maker can formulate  irrespective
of the information available to him. We will focus on extensions satisfying monotonicity : that is,
we require that for any two acts f; g 2 B() if f  g then the decision maker must prefer f to
g. We believe that the necessity to restrict to monotone extensions is transparent, and requires
no further explanation. Later, we will also introduce another property (translation invariance),
which is also independent of the information. We believe that, in our setting, the introduction of
this property is also mandatory, and we will argue in favor of our point of view. But, since some
disagreement is possible, we take care of formulating our results also in absence of this property.
The present section is divided into three subsections. The rst contains some basic lemmata
that lead to the proof of the main theorem of this section. This is proved in the second subsection.
It states that behavior emerging in the face of Ambiguity belongs to the class of Invariant Bi-
separable preferences (or, in fact, to a wider class, if translation invariance is not imposed). The
third subsection introduces some symmetry considerations, which are mainly motivated by the
examples of the previous sections. These considerations lead to singling out a special model within
the class of IB preferences: the -MEU model.
10.1 Some lemmata
Let K be a linear subspace of B() which contains the constant functions, and let E : K  ! R
be a positive linear functional. In terms of interpretation, K is to be thought of as the subset
of subjectively measurable acts and E as the expected utility functional dened on those. Let us
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dene two new functionals I
¯
: B()  ! R and I : B()  ! R as follows
I
¯
(f) = sup
g2K
fE(g) j g  fg
I(f) = inf
g2K
fE(g) j g  fg
Lemma 23 I
¯
and I are monotone, translation invariant extensions of E. Moreover, I
¯
 I. In
addition, I
¯
is super-additive and I is sub-additive.
Proof. (a) I
¯
and I are extensions of I:
8f 2 B(), the sets fg  f j g 2 Kg and fg  f j g 2 Kg are both nonempty because f is
bounded and K contains the constant functions. Thus, both I
¯
and I are well-dened and they are
extensions of E since f 2 K implies I(f) = E(f) =I
¯
(f).
(b) I
¯
 I: For any  ;' 2 K such that   f  ', we have that E( )  E(') because E is
positive. Hence,
I(f) = inf
f f j 2Kg
E( )  sup
f'f j'2Kg
E( ) = I
¯
(f)
(c) I
¯
and I are monotone:
f  h =) f  f j  2 Kg  f  h j  2 Kg
=) I(f)  I(h)
similarly,
f  h =) f  f j  2 Kg  f  h j  2 Kg
=) I
¯
(f)  I
¯
(h)
(d) I
¯
and I are translation invariant:
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Let   0 and  2 R, and let 1 be the function that is identically equal to 1 on S. Then,
I
¯
(f + 1) = sup
g2K
fE(g) j g  f + 1g
= sup
 2K
fE( + 1) j  + 1  f + 1g b/c K is a linear space
which contains the constants
= sup
 2K
fE( ) +  j   fg by linearity of E
=  sup
 2K
fE( ) j   fg+ 
= I
¯
(f) + 
which shows that I
¯
is translation invariant. The proof for I is similar.
(e) I is sub-additive and I
¯
is super-additive:
Let f; h 2 B(). By denition,
I(f) = inf
g2K
fE(g) j g  fg
Thus, 8" > 0 9g1; g2 2 K such that (1) g1  f , g2  h; and (2) I(f) > E(g1) " and I(h) > E(g2) ".
Since g1 + g2  f + h, we have (by denition of I) that
I(f + h)  E(g1 + g2) < I(f) + I(h) + 2"
By letting "! 0, we conclude that
I(f + h)  I(f) + I(h)
that is the sub-additivity of I.
Similarly, 8" > 0 9g1; g2 2 K such that (1) g1  f , g2  h; and (2) I¯(f) < E(g1) + " and
I
¯
(h) < E(g2) + ". Hence,
I
¯
(f + h)  E(g1 + g2) > I¯(f) + I¯(h)  2"
from which we conclude that
I
¯
(f + h)  I
¯
(f) + I
¯
(h)
31
that is the super additivity of I
¯
.
In the next Lemma, we are going to see that any monotone extension of E : K  ! R is
sandwiched between I
¯
and I.
Lemma 24 If J : B()  ! R is a monotone extension of E : K  ! R, then 8f 2 B()
I
¯
(f)  J(f)  I(f)
Proof. By the way of contradiction, assume that there exists an f 2 B() such that J(f) > I(f).
Clearly, f 2 B()nK. Since f 2 B() and K contains the constant functions, the set
MK(f) = fg  f j g 2 Kg 6= ?
and, by J = E on K and by the fact that J is monotone, we have that for every g 2MK(f)
E(g) = J(g)  J(f) > I(f)
which implies that J(f) is a lower bound for E(g) on MK(f), thus contradicting the denition of
I(f) (as I(f) = inf
g2MK(f)
E(g)). We conclude that I(f)  J(f), 8f 2 B().
In a similar fashion, suppose that 9f 2 B() such that J(f) <I
¯
(f). Since the constant mappings
are in K
mK(f) = fg  f j g 2 Kg 6= ?
and, by the monotonicity of J and J = E on K, we have that 8g 2 mK(f)
I
¯
(f) > J(f)  J(g) = E(g)
which implies that J(f) is an upper bound for E(g) on mK(f), thus contradicting the denition of
I
¯
(f) (as I
¯
(f) = sup
g2mK(f)
E(g)). We conclude that I
¯
(f)  J(f), 8f 2 B().
The next Lemma gives us a representation of the functionals I
¯
and I. It is a simple consequence
of the Hahn-Banach theorem. Its proof is standard and is included here only for completeness.
Lemma 25 (representation of I
¯
and I) Assume that E(1) = 1. There exists a unique convex,
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weak*-compact set L(I) of linear functionals such that
I
¯
(f) = min
L2L(I)
L(f) and I(f) = max
L2L(I)
L(f)
Proof. Let B0 denote the set of all linear functionals on B(). Let
L(I) = L 2 B0 j L is an extension to B() of E , I  L  I
¯
and L(1) = E(1)	
Notice that all elements of L(I) are positive due to the monotonicity of I
¯
and that they are contin-
uous because they are bounded owing to the condition L(1) = E(1). Moreover, owing to Lemma
24, the elements of L(I) are all the positive extensions of I. By Hahn-Banach, L(I) is nonempty.
For f 2 B(), let Kf = linfK; fg be the linear subspace spanned by K and f . The functional
L
¯ f
: Kf  ! R dened by
L
¯ f
(f + k) = I
¯
(f) + I
¯
(k)
is linear on Kf , L¯ f
I
¯
on Kf (by the super-additivity of I¯
) and has the property that L
¯ f
(f) =I
¯
(f).
Again by Hahn-Banach, L
¯ f
has an extension which belongs to L(I), which proves the formula for
I
¯
. Similarly, the functional Lf : Kf  ! R dened by
Lf (f + k) = I(f) +  I(k)
is linear on Kf , Lf  I on Kf (by the sub-additivity of I) and has the property that Lf (f) = I(f).
Again by Hahn-Banach, Lf has an extension which belongs to L(I), which proves the formula for I.
Uniqueness of L(I) follows from a standard separation argument as, for instance, in [13]. Convexity
and weak*-compactness of L(I) are obvious.
10.2 ... all priors compatible with his limited information
When facing Ambiguity the decision maker is able to determine, on the basis of his information,
an expected utility functional on the space of subjectively measurable acts. This determination
encompasses all the information available to him. Once this is done, he must face the problem of
evaluating those acts that are not subjectively measurable, that is he must somehow extend his
33
evaluation to the set of all acts. As we observed, the most natural way of doing so is to demand that
the extension should satisfy the property of monotonicity (which is automatically satised on the
set of subjectively measurable acts). In this section, we begin by studying the class of all monotone
extensions of the decision makers functional on the subjectively measurable acts. From these, we
will then single out those that respect the decision makers information, that is those that use the
knowledge of the EU functional on the space of subjectively measurable acts and that knowledge
only. We will, then, use these to characterize the type of behavior that emerges in situations of
Ambiguity.
Let E denote the expected utility functional on the set of subjectively measurable acts (Propo-
sition 18). By Lemma 24, any monotone extension of E to B() has the form
I(f) = (f)I
¯
(f) + (1  (f))I(f)
where 8f 2 B(), (f) 2 [0; 1]. By combining Lemma 25 with the Riesz representation theorem,
we can re-write this
I(f) = (f)min
P2C
Z
fdP + (1  (f))max
P2C
Z
fdP (2)
where C is a (uniquely determined) convex, weak*-compact subset of ba+1 (). Thus, (2) gives us
the class of all monotone extensions of E . We must now isolate those extensions that do not use
more information than the one available to the decision maker, which is the one embedded into
the functional E . Clearly, the functionals I
¯
and I are two such extension as they use only the set
of Hahn-Banach extensions of E . In general, this is not true for all functionals of the type (2). In
fact, the condition translates into a restriction on the coe¢ cient () in (2).
Denition 26 An extension I : B()  ! R of the functional E is measurable with respect to the
decision maker information i¤
Z
fdP =
Z
gdP for all P 2 C =) (f) = (g)
That is, if two acts have the same evaluation according to each and every Hahn-Banach exten-
sion, then they should be evaluated in the same way. Transparently, this condition guarantees that
the decision maker uses only the knowledge of the (set of) Hahn-Banach extensions of E to dene
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the functional I.
As we have already observed, both functionals I
¯
and I are measurable with respect to the
decision makers information. These functionals also satisfy an extra property that is not necessarily
shared by a general functional of the form (2): translation invariance, that is for all a  0, b 2 R it
holds that I
¯
(af + b1) = aI
¯
(f) + b and I(af + b1) = aI(f) + b. In the setting we have been focusing
on, translation invariance is an important property. In fact, we have been assuming the existence
of an a¢ ne utility function on the outcome space X, and this utility is unique only up to a positive
a¢ ne transformation. In this context, the translation invariance of the preference functional I is the
same as the equivariance of I with respect to transformations of the utility on the outcome space,
that is the statement that the representation of the decision makers preference does not depend
on the choice of the utility (within the class of admissible utilities). Because of this, we believe
that translation invariance is a property that should be imposed on all the admissible extensions
of E . Be that as it may, when imposed, translation invariance also translates into a restriction on
the coe¢ cient () in (2). The theorem below summarizes our ndings (the proof of (4) is omitted
as it follows from simple algebra).
Theorem 27 A decision maker facing Ambiguity is characterized by a preference functional I :
B()  ! R with the following properties:
(1) I is a positive linear functional on the linear subspace of subjectively measurable acts, which
is determined by (1) in Proposition 18.
(2) I is of the form
I(f) = (f)min
P2C
Z
fdP + (1  (f))max
P2C
Z
fdP
where C is a (unique) convex, weak*-compact subset of ba+1 () and (f) 2 [0; 1].
(3) The coe¢ cient () in (2) satises
Z
fdP =
Z
gdP for all P 2 C =) (f) = (g)
(4) I is translation invariant i¤ for all a  0, b 2 R and f 2 B(), the coe¢ cient () in (2)
35
satises
(af + b1) = (f)
With Theorem 27, we have characterized the class of preference functionals that emerge in
response to Ambiguity. The next theorem expresses the same characterization in terms of properties
of a preference relation on the set of acts.
Theorem 28 Consider a decision maker whose preference functional satises properties (1) to (4)
in Theorem 27. Then his preference relation on the set of all acts is an Invariant Bi-separable
preference.
Proof. This is an entirely standard argument. Axiom A5 of Section 2 is satised (by construction)
by virtue of our identication of the acts with B(). Since the preference functional is R-valued,
A1 is satised. Property (4) implies that A2 is satised, and the monotonicity of the functional
implies that so is A4. By virtue of a well-known elementary argument, monotonicity and translation
invariance of the functional imply its sup-norm continuity which, in turn, implies A3.
Remark 29 It is worth noticing that the combination of Theorem 27 and Theorem 28 casts an
entirely new light on property (3) in Theorem 27. This property originally appeared in [10] as a
feature of Invariant Bi-separable preferences. Now, Theorem 27 and Theorem 28 tell us something
entirely new: this property is precisely what indicates that the decision maker extends his preference
functional on the basis of limited information.
As a consequence of the previous theorem and of Theorem 1, we also have
Corollary 30 The preference functional of a decision maker facing Ambiguity is of the form
I(f) =
Z
C
(f)d =
Z
C
Z
S
fdPd(P )
where  is a capacity on the Borel subsets of C.
This corollary claries the intuition that we gave in Remark 4 of Section 3 and provides the
formal ground for that suggestion: Integrating over priors with bad information gives rise to a
non-additive integral or, if the reader prefers, Lebesgue integration over a non-measurable partition
is represented by a Choquet integral.
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10.3 Symmetry considerations
By Theorem 28, the preferences that emerge in situations of Ambiguity are Invariant Bi-separable.
Moreover, Theorem 27 makes it clear that all of its subclasses obtain by imposing restrictions on
the coe¢ cient (f), that is on the function () : B()  ! R in (2). In this way, one derives, for
instance, the models of maxmin-EU, maxmax-EU, Choquet EU, etc. In this section, we are going
to focus on a particular restriction on the function (), one that is motivated by the examples that
we have encountered in this paper.
We begin with the three-point version of Ellsbergs experiment discussed at the end of Section
9. When we introduced Ellsbergs experiment in Section 6.2, we noticed that the behavior which is
typically observed mirrors the symmetry in the information: to an information that is symmetric
in B and Y , there corresponds a table of preferences that is symmetric in B and Y . We can now
express this properly.
Example 31 (Ex. 22 Sec. 9 ctnd) Consider Example 22 of Section 9, and let % be a preference
relation represented by a functional satisfying conditions (1) to (3) in Theorem 27. The preference
% is symmetric with respect to B and Y i¤ (B) = (Y ). Consequently, since the specication
of the coe¢ cient  is immaterial in the case of unambiguously measurable acts, the preference
functional representing a symmetric preference is of the form
I(f) = min
P2C
Z
fdP + (1  )max
P2C
Z
fdP
Thus, the model with  constant emerges in the three-point example as the only model that
treats B and Y symmetrically.
Example 32 (Ex. Sec. 6.3 and Ex. Sec. 6.4 ctnd) Similar considerations can be made for
the other two versions of Ellsbergexperiment studied in 6.3 and Sec. 6.4, and then again in Sec.
9. In these examples, however, the condition (B) = (Y ) is not su¢ cient to obtain the -MEU
model (i.e., the model with  constant). This is so because the condition (B) = (Y ) does not
imply anything with regard to the (strict) subsets of B and Y and on the coe¢ cient that should be
assigned to the bets on those subsets.
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Example 33 (Ex. Sec. 6.1 ctnd) In the measure equivalence example of Sec. 6.1, there are
nearly no extra conditions that can be imposed in a natural way on the extension from the set
of subjectively measurable (= unambiguous) acts. In fact, for C = ca+1 (), not even condition
(3) bites, and every monotone extension is automatically measurable with respect to the decision
makers information. It is still meaningful, however, to talk about symmetric extensions as those
extensions that treat all acts in the same way, that is (f) = (g) for all f; g 2 B(). In this
sense, -MEU is the only (fully) symmetric extension in the measure equivalence example.
The corollary below summarizes the discussion of this section on the -MEU model (notice that
measurability of -MEU with respect to the decision makers information is automatic).
Corollary 34 Suppose that the information structure available to the decision maker is such that
condition (6) in Proposition 18 is satised. Then, -MEU is the only fully symmetric measurable
extension from the set of subjectively measurable acts.
11 Perceived ambiguity and the set of predictives in non-EU the-
ories
The search for indicators of the ambiguity perceived by a decision maker has been a recurrent theme
in the literature on Ambiguous Events. For the class of preferences determined above, it is well-
known that the set of priors appearing in the representations of those non-Eu functionals cannot
be taken, at least at face value, as one such indicator. This is so because di¤erent combinations
of sets of priors and functions () may give rise to the same functional. A well-studied example
is provided by the -MEU model encountered above: for 0    1, one can start with a set of
priors C, dene the -MEU functional by using this C, and then show that there exists another
representation of the same preference with a set of priors C0 6= C and a (typically) non-constant
functions () (see, for instance, [7]). Truth to say, there is nothing peculiar to -MEU in this.
It even happens in the context of Expected Utility: take a set of priors C and a measure  on it,
and assume that the information is the best possible like in Section 4; then, the pair (C; ) denes
an EU functional but the exact same functional is dened by the pair (fP g; (P )), where P  is
the average measure as in Section 4 and  is the Dirac measure. It is also clear that there are,
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generally speaking, many pairs (C0; 0) which dene the same linear functional as that dened by
P . Classically, the (uniquely determined) measure P  is the decision makers "predictive": given
his information a pair of the form (C0; 0) and a measurable partition a Bayesian decision maker
picks the best (in a Bayesian sense) distribution to predict the next draw from set of states S. In
principle, P  need not even be in C0 (but, necessarily, it is in its convex hull). The situation is
analogous in the non-EU case: given his information (in particular, a set of possible probabilistic
views of the world) the decision maker determines a set of predictives. The only di¤erence is that
this set is not a singleton, which is what "reveals" the presence of Ambiguity. Two questions need
to be addressed, at this point: What is the set of predictives in the non-Eu case? and, What is
an indicator of the Ambiguity perceived by the decision maker? In particular, one might want to
ask if the two necessarily coincide. We are going to answer these questions in the remainder of this
section and, in doing so, we will be able to rene on an observation that we made elsewhere ([2,
Section 3.1]).
At this point of the exposition, it is quite obvious that an indicator of the Ambiguity perceived
by the decision maker is the subspace MA of subjectively measurable acts: the larger this subspace
the less the Ambiguity which is perceived.6 As it is desirable of any Ambiguity index, this indicator
is independent of the decision makers attitude toward Ambiguity. It is so because the subspace
MA is determined before the extension of the preference functional, and the attitude toward
ambiguity appears only in that process of extension. Another indicator, equivalent to the one
just proposed, but with the additional appeal of representing the Ambiguity by means of a set of
probability measures, can be achieved as follows. The subspace MA and the linear functional
dened on it are uniquely associated to the set of Hahn-Banach extensions of that functional which,
in turn, can be represented (via the Riesz theorem) by a set of probability measures. Let us denote
this set by CMA. Because the association is unique, this set provides us with the same information
as MA: the smaller MA, the larger CMA and the larger the perceived Ambiguity. We can use
these observations to make comparisons across decision makers with regard to the Ambiguity that
they perceive as well as their aversion toward that Ambiguity. Let dmi denote a generic decision
maker and let MAi be his subspace of subjectively measurable acts.
6We dropped the reference to the system cp as that is immaterial to the discussion of this section.
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Denition 35 We say that dm1 perceives more ambiguity than dm2 i¤ MA1  MA2 i¤
CMA1  CMA2.
Also, by denoting by Ii the preference functional of dmi and by i() the function that appears
in that functional as obtained in Section 10.2, we have
Denition 36 We say that dm1 is more ambiguity averse than dm2 i¤ 1(f)  2(f) for every
f 2 B().
Given the meaning of CMAi , Denition 36 follows naturally because it states that dm1 has a
consistently more pessimistic attitude than dm2. Be it clear, however, that this comparison refers
to the representations of Ii which use CMAi and to those representations only, and does not
extend to other representations of the decision makerspreference functionals. This qualication
is necessary because the sets of probability measures appearing in those representations cannot be
interpreted, at least not in an obvious way, as indicators of the perceived ambiguity. It is worth
stressing that the comparison in Denition 36 does not require, unlike [10], the sets CMA1 and
CMA2 to be in any pre-specied relation; that is, Denition 36 allows for comparisons of decision
makers who might have very di¤erent perceptions of ambiguity.
On a logical ground, Denition 35 and Denition 36 seem to us rather uncontroversial. Their
potential weakness is that the set MAi (or CMAi), which is their crucial ingredient, is not
immediately derivable from the decision makers choices. As we know, MAi is a linear subspace
with the property that the decision makers preference functional is linear on it. Thus, in an attempt
to uncover MAi from the decision makers choices, one would have to look for something like "the
largest subspace where the preference functional is linear". An attempt of this sort, however, would
inevitably run into two problems. The rst, somewhat minor, is that the notion of "largest subspace
where the preference functional is linear" is ill-dened. The second, more substantial, is that by
following that strategy one might end up determining something other than MAi. The reason
is that some "extra-linearity" may appear when extending the preference functional from MAi,
which would result in the existence of subspaces where the preference is linear which are strictly
larger than MAi. Thus, by treating one of these subspaces as MAi, one would e¤ectively
underestimate the ambiguity perceived by the decision maker (equivalently, one would determine a
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set of priors strictly smaller than CMAi). In passing, we should like to observe that the tendency
of underestimating ambiguity is inherent to all those approaches that derive Ambiguity indicators
on the basis of the geometric properties of the preference functional (hence, of the decision makers
choices). We will come back to this point momentarily. For now, we are going to elaborate more on
the two issues just mentioned. This will shed light on the problem of nding the set of predictives
and of unveiling its relation with the set CMA. We begin with a simple example showing us that
extra-linearities can pop up easily in the extension process.
Example 37 Let C be an arbitrary, non-singleton, set of probability measures. Dene the set
UMA, and let E be the associated linear functional on it. Since C is not a singleton, B()nUMA
is non-empty. Let I be the -MEU extension of E to B(). Then, it is easy to see that if  = 1=2
the functional I is linear on linff; UMAg for every f 2 B()nUMA.
The example shows that we can exhibit a decision maker for whom MAi = UMA, who has
a non-linear (-MEU) preference functional on the set of all acts and whose preference functional
is linear on many subspaces which all contain MAi strictly. Elaboration on the same example
also shows that we can exhibit a decision maker who satises all the above properties and whose
preference functional is, in addition, never linear on linff; g; UMAg for f; g 2 B()nUMA and
f 6= g. Thus, in particular, the notion of "largest subspace on which I is linear" is meaningless.
This motivates the following denitions.
Denition 38 Let I be a preference functional satisfying the conditions of Theorem 27. We say
that
(a) A subspace S  B() is an AI subspace for I if I is linear on S.
(b) An AI subspace S is said to be saturated if for any g 2 B()nS, linfg;Sg is not an AI
subspace.
Let SAI denote the class of all saturated AI subspaces, and dene
K = \
S2SAI
S
That is, K is the intersection of all saturated AI subspaces. Since K is itself a linear subspace and
I is linear on K, we can determine the set of all Hahn-Banach extensions of the restriction of I to
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K and, hence, associate K to a set of probability measures C. Proposition 39 below shows that
C is the set CGMM that Ghirardato el al. derive in [10] and that they interpret as an indicator of
the ambiguity perceived by the decision maker. The proposition also shows that K is equal to the
set of crisp acts of [10], and gives the relation of these two sets with CMA and MA, respectively.
Proposition 39 Let I be a preference functional satisfying the condition of Theorem 27. We have
(a) The set C is equal to the set CGMM in [10, Prop. 4]
(b) K is equal to the set of crisp acts in [10, Prop. 10]
(c) K  MA  UMA
(d) C  CMA
Proof. (a) Consider the set of all Hahn-Banach extensions of the restriction of I to K. By
Lemmata 24 and 25 and [2, Theorems 1 and 2], I admits a representation of the form
I(f) =
Z
C
(f)d
where  is a capacity on the Borel subsets of C. Dene now a preference relation % on B() by
f % g iff
Z
fdP 
Z
gdP for all P 2 C iff (f)  (g)
By the monotonicity of the Choquet integral, we have that (f)  (g) implies I(f)  I(g), which
shows that f % g implies f % g, that is % is a sub-relation of the decision makers preference
relation %. Trivially, the relation % satises the Independence Axiom; hence, % is also a sub-
relation of the unambiguous preference relation of [10] since the latter is the maximal restriction of
% which satises the Independence Axiom (see [10, Prop. 3 part (7)]). This shows that C  CGMM .
We want to show that equality holds. To begin, notice that the set of all Hahn-Banach extensions
of I coincide on K, that I( ) =
Z
 dP for all  2 K, and that this value is independent of the
choice of P in C. Thus, K is a subspace of (in fact, equal to) the linear subspace of B() dened
by 
l 2 B() j
Z
ldP =
Z
ldP 0 for all P; P 0 2 C

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Suppose now that the inclusion C  CGMM is strict, that is there exists a P 2 CnCGMM . Let
K0 =

l 2 B() j
Z
ldP =
Z
ldP 0 for all P; P 0 2 CGMM

Then K0  K strictly. But, [10, Prop. 10 part (iv)] implies that K0 belongs to any saturated AI
subspace, hence to their intersection. Since this contradicts the denition of K, we conclude that
C = CGMM .
(b) By [10, Prop 10 part (iii)], K0 is the set of crisp acts, and C = CGMM implies K0 = K.
(c) Since the decision makers preference relation is, by construction linear on MA, MA is
contained in all saturated AI subspaces, hence in K.
(d) Follows at once from (c).
Ghirardato et al. use the set C as an indicator of the ambiguity perceived by the decision maker.
Since C is possibly smaller than CMA, their indicator tends to underestimate this ambiguity: Our
reasoning above shows that (a) we can start o¤ with a decision maker whose space of subjectively
measurable acts is strictly included in K; (b) determine CMA; (c) write down his preference
functional as ICMA(f) = (f) minCMA
(f) + (1 (f))max
CMA
(f); and, nally (d) choose the function
() so as to guarantee that the intersection of all saturated AI subspaces of ICMA is precisely K.
Notice, in particular, that the choice of the function () enters the determination of K, which
shows that the information contained in K (equivalently, in C) inevitably mixes the perception of
ambiguity with the attitude toward it. A moment of thought shows that this problem is inherent to
all those approaches that determine, like in the case of Ghirardato et al.,7 indicators of Ambiguity
by using only geometric properties of the preference functional.
The set C of Ghirardato et al., however, still plays a very important role, this time exactly
because it is derived only on the basis of the geometric properties of the preference functional: the
set C represents that Ambiguity that cannot be reduced by the decision maker when he extends
the preference functional from MA. As such, the set C (or rather the set of its extreme points)
represents the set of predictives: those probability measures that the decision maker actually uses
to evaluate the acts. In general, there is nothing strange about the fact that this set might be
smaller than the one representing the ambiguity. As we saw above, extra-linearities (e¤ectively
7Ghirardato et al. determine the set C by using the decision makers unambiguous preference relation. Loosely
speaking, this is [10, Prop. 10 part (7)] the part of the functional I which satises linearity.
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"reductions" of Ambiguity) may emerge during the process of extension from MA, and take
the form of restrictions on the function () generated in that extension. These restrictions may
be motivated by various considerations like, for instance, the symmetry considerations that we
encountered in Ellsbergs experiments.
Example 40 Restrictions of the form (f) + ( f) = 1 have the feature that the extended func-
tional is always linear on linff; UMAg and might express conditions on how to evaluate acts when
on di¤erent sides of the market (buy or sell).
To summarize, in our opinion the correct indicator of the Ambiguity perceived by the decision
maker is the set CMA (or, equivalently, the linear subspace MA). The set of predictives is the
set C of Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [10] and represents that ambiguity that cannot be
reduced when evaluating acts. C is always contained in CMA, and to use C as an indicator of
the Ambiguity perceived by the decision maker may lead to underestimate that Ambiguity. We
conclude by nding an "upper bound" for the set CMA that can be derived from the decision
makers choices. The basic idea is to relate the representation of Invariant Bi-separable preferences
given by Ghirardato et al. to other possible representations, and try to detect the extra-linearities
discussed above. The key observation is provided by part (c) of Proposition 39 above, which tells
us that, as extra-linearities appear, the crisps act may grow from UMA to K. For C an arbitrary
set of probability measures, let us denote by IC the functionals of the form
IC(f) = C(f)minC
(f) + (1  C(f))maxC (f) (3)
where f 2 B(), (f) : C  ! R is dened by (f)(P ) =
Z
fdP and C(f) 2 [0; 1]. Also, let
var
C
(f) = max
C
(f)   min
C
(f). Now, let % be an Invariant Bi-separable preference. By [10], %
admits a representation by a functional I of the type
IC(f) = C(f)minC
(f) + (1  C(f))maxC (f)
where C is the set of predictives discussed above. For K the corresponding set of crisp acts, let
us say that an act  2 K satises Property L if there exists a representation of % of the type (3)
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such that either (a) var
C
() = 0; or, (b) C() =
max
C
() R dP
var
C
() for P 2 C.
Proposition 41 Let C^ be largest subset of ba+1 () such that every act in K has Property L. Then,
C  CMA  C^.
Notice that when C = C, every  2 K satises Property L with var
C
() = 0. When we
move to representations of the same preference which use a C which strictly contains C, for some
 2 K the property var
C
() = 0 has to disappear. Yet, the new functional still has to stay linear
on K, which means that the function C() is to be chosen so to preserve this linearity. This is
exactly what part (b) of Property L demands. Notice that an arbitrary set C may not have the
property that every act in K has Property L. This is so because the necessity of satisfying part
(b) of Property L may be in conict with other properties that the function () has to satisfy,
for instance properties (3) and (4) in Theorem 27 (that is, if C is such that every act in K has
Property L, then IC may not be a representation of %). If there exists a set C strictly larger than
C with the property that every act in K has Property L, then we can think of C as representing
the Ambiguity and of C as its set of predictives. From what we have seen above, it follows that
C  CMA  C^.
Proposition 41 provides us with a method for estimating CMA as well as for identifying those
situations in which C = CMA. Clearly, the e¤ectiveness of Proposition 41 is greatly enhanced
when some extra information, in the form of a restriction on the function (), is available. For
instance, it is clear that by restricting to the class of -MEU preferences, or by simply knowing that
the preference has an -MEU representation, considerably reduces the ability of satisfying part (b)
of Property L and, hence, makes it more likely that C = CMA.
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APPENDICES
A Conditional measures
Let (C;B; ) be a measure space, let I be a partition of C (modulo -measure 0 events) and let C=I
denote the quotient space. Let  : C  ! C=I be the canonical projection. The canonical -eld on
C=I is the nest -eld that makes the canonical projection measurable. The measure structure
induced by  on C=I consists of the canonical -eld and the image measure (pushforward) of 
under . We recall the following denition.
Denition 42 A canonical system of conditional measures associated to the partition I is a family
of measures f;  2 Ig, with the following properties
(i) for any A 2 B, the set A \  is measurable in  for almost all  2 C=I and the function
(A \ ) : C=I ! R is measurable; and
(ii) for any A 2 B,
(A) =
Z
C=I
(A \ )d0
where 0 is the pushforward of  under the canonical projection  : C  ! C=I.
B Standard Spaces
A Polish space, (X; ), is a separable, completely metrizable topological space. Given the topology
 on X, the Borel eld is the one generated by the closed sets. A Standard Borel space is a
Polish space stripped down to its Borel structure.
Given two measurable spaces, (X1;B1) and (X2;B2), a mapping X1  ! X2 is called a Borel
isomorphism if it is a bijection and is bimeasurable.
Borel isomorphism theorem (see [27, Theorem 3.3.13]) Any two uncountable standard Borel
spaces are Borel isomorphic.
A Standard Borel space along with a nite nonatomic measure is a called a Standard Lebesgue
space. A measurable set in a Standard Lebesgue space is a set which di¤ers from a Borel set by a
set of measure zero.
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Given two measure spaces, (X1;B1;m1) and (X2;B2;m2), a measurable mapping T : X1  ! X2
is a measure preserving transformation if for all E 2 B2 we have
m1(T
 1(E)) = m2(E)
If T is bijective and its inverse T 1 is also measure-preserving, then T is an invertible measure-
preserving transformation. Two measure spaces, (X1;B1;m1) and (X2;B2;m2), are isomorphic if
there exists an invertible measure preserving transformation T : X1  ! X2.
Isomorphism of Lebesgue Spaces (see [29, Theorem 2.1]) Any two Standard Lebesgue spaces
are isomorphic.
C A Polish setting
In combination, the two assumptions below guarantee that the set of measures C in Theorem 1 is
a Polish space.
Standard State Space The measurable space (S;) is a standard Borel space.
Let % be a preference relation satisfying Axioms 1 to 5. Let D denote the unambiguous prefer-
ence relation ([10], Sec. B.3) associated to %.
Axiom of Monotone Continuity (see [10]) For all x; y; z 2 X such that y B z, and all se-
quences of events fAngn1   with An # ;, there exists n 2 N such that y B xAnz.
The Axiom of Monotone Continuity is equivalent to the property that all the measures in
Theorem 1 are countably additive [10, Sec. B.3]. Let P() denote the space of regular Borel
measures on .
Theorem 43 Let (S;) be a standard Borel space. A preference relation % on A satises Axioms
1 to 5 and the Axiom of Monotone Continuity i¤ Theorem 1 holds and the set C  P(). In
particular, C is a Polish space.
In the course of the proof, we will denote by (ba(); Y ) the weak topology on ba() induced
by a set of mappings Y .
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Proof. Assume that Theorem 1 holds with C  P(). The function  dened in Theorem 1 is
sup-norm to sup-norm continuous as a consequence of the inequality
k(f)  (g)k1 = sup
P2C
Z fdP   Z gdP   sup
P2C
Z
jf   gj dP
 sup
P2C
Z
sup
s2S
jf   gj dP = kf   gk1
Since the Choquet integral is sup-norm continuous, it follows that the preference dened by the
functional in Theorem 1 satises Axioms 1 and 3. By the monotonicity and translation invariance
of both the Lebesgue integral and the Choquet integral, Axioms 2 and 4 are also satised. Finally,
the Axiom of Monotone Continuity is satised by [10, Sec. B.3]. Now, the converse. Since %
satises Axioms 1 to 5, Theorem 1 holds as stated in Section 2. We want to show that, when the
Axiom of Monotone Continuity is satised, Theorem 1 continues to hold with C  P() and that
this space is Polish. Our strategy will be as follows. We are going to change the topology on the set
ba() (hence, on C). We will show that, when the the Axiom of Monotone Continuity is satised,
this change in the topology leaves C compact. As the new topology is coarser than the old one,
the functions (f) : C  ! R are no-longer necessarily continuous. We are going to show, however,
that even with the new topology (f) is always a measurable function for the Borel class dened
by the new topology, 8f 2 B(). This will guarantee that the functional dened in Theorem 1 is
still well-dened and, being dened pointwise in the exact same way, it still represents the same
preference.
From Theorem 1, we know that C is a weak*-compact subset of (ba(); (ba(); B())). By the
Axiom of Monotone Continuity, all the probabilities in C are countably additive. By the assumption
that (S;) is standard Borel, it follows that all the probabilities in C are regular. If we replace the
topology (ba(); B()) with the topology (ba(); Cb(S)) Cb(S) the set of continuous bounded
functions on S then C remains compact because the new topology is weaker than the original
one. In particular, C is closed. Finally, (S;) standard implies that the space P() is Polish in the
topology (P(); Cb(S)), and we conclude that C is Polish as well. Next, dene  as in Theorem
1. Since all the measures in C are bounded and countably additive, the Monotone Convergence
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Theorem implies that  is normal, that is
fn % f =) (fn)% (f); n 2 N
Let E 2 , and let E denote the indicator function of the set E. Then, (E) is obviously bounded
and it is well-known that (E) is measurable for the Borel -algebra generated by (P(); Cb(S))
[1, Lemma 14.16]; that is, (E) 2 B(B) for all E 2 . If h 2 B() is a simple function, then h
can be written as a nite linear combination of indicator functions, and linearity of  along with
the previous observation imply that (h) 2 B(B). Finally, if f 2 B() is any function, then there
exists a sequence of simple functions ffng  B() such that fn % f , and normality of  implies
that (f) 2 B(B). We conclude that when C is equipped with the Polish topology (P(); Cb(S)),
the linear mapping  takes B() into a subset of B(B).
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